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A CONSISTENCY PROOF FOR SOME RESTRICTIONS OF TAIT’S
REFLECTION PRINCIPLES
RUPERT McCALLUM
Abstract. In [5] Tait identifies a set of reflection principles which he calls Γ
(2)
n -reflection
principles which Peter Koellner has shown to be consistent relative to κ(ω), the first ω-
Erdo¨s cardinal, in [2]. Tait also goes on in the same work to define a set of reflection
principles which he calls Γ
(m)
n -reflection principles; however Koellner has shown that these
are inconsistent when m > 2 in [3], but identifies restricted versions of them which he proves
consistent relative to κ(ω). In this paper we introduce a new large-cardinal property with an
ordinal parameter α > 0, calling those cardinals which satisfy it α-reflective cardinals. Its
definition is motivated by the remarks Tait makes in [5] about why reflection principles must
be restricted when parameters of third or higher order are introduced. We prove that if κ is
iκ+α+1-supercompact and 0 < α < κ then κ is α-reflective. Furthermore we show that α-
reflective cardinals relativize to L, and that if κ(ω) exists then the set of cardinals λ < κ(ω),
such that λ is α-refective for all α such that 0 < α < λ, is a stationary subset of κ(ω).
We show that an ω-reflective cardinal satisfies some restricted versions of Γ
(m)
n -reflection, as
well as all the reflection properties which Koellner proves consistent in [3].
Part of this paper was written while I was a Research Intensive Academic at the Australian
Catholic University. I made further revisions to it while I was an Adjunct Lecturer at the
University of New South Wales, and while I held a post-doctoral position at the University
of Mu¨nster. I am grateful to these institutions for their support. I am also thankful to Peter
Koellner for giving me helpful feedback on an early draft.
1. Introduction
We are going to investigate reflection principles, which postulate the existence of a level
of the universe Vκ, whose properties reflect down to some lower level Vβ where β < κ. It is
useful to begin by considering reflection principles involving second-order parameters only.
In later sections we will consider the issues which arise when one introduces higher-order
parameters.
The cardinals yielded by these reflection principles involving second-order parameters only
are called “indescribable cardinals”. These principles assert the existence of a cardinal κ such
that certain statements true in Vκ hold when relativized to a level Vβ where β < κ. The
strength of the reflection principles increase as one increases the expressive power of the
language in which the statements are formulated, and the complexity of the formulas which
express them. For example, one may consider the case where the language L in which the
statements are expressed is the union of the nth-order languages of set theory for all n < ω.
We denote the order of a variable with a superscript, so that X(m) is a variable of mth order.
Second-order variables range over classes, for example. If a formula ϕ in the language L
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is relativized to Vκ, then the variables of mth order range over Vκ+m−1. Here Vκ is being
treated as the universe.
Definition 1.1. We say that a formula in the language L is a Πm0 -formula if the only
quantified variables it contains are at most mth order.
We say that a formula in the language L is a Πm1 -formula if it consists of a block of universal
(m+ 1)th order quantifiers tacked on to the beginning of a Πm0 -formula.
We say that a formula in the language L is Σmk+1 if it consists of a block of existential
(m+ 1)th-order quantifiers tacked on to the beginning of a Πmk -formula.
We say that a formula in the language L is Πmk+1 if it consists of a block of universal (m+1)th-
order quantifiers tacked on to the beginning of a Σmk -formula.
Definition 1.2. If ϕ is formula in the language L, we denote by ϕβ the result of relativizing
every mth-order quantifier to Vβ+m−1. If X
(2) is a second-order variable we abbreviate X(2)∩
Vβ to X
(2),β.
Definition 1.3. If Ω is a class of formulas of L, we say that κ is Ω-indescribable if for all
formulas ϕ ∈ Ω whose only free variable is second-order, for all sets U ⊂ Vκ, ϕ
κ(U) =⇒ ∃β <
κ ϕβ(Uβ). We say that κ is totally indescribable if it is Πmn -indescribable for all m,n > 0.
Definition 1.4. Suppose that α is an ordinal. We say that κ is α-indescribable if for all Π10
formulas ϕ in the language L whose only free variable is second-order, for all sets U ⊂ Vκ,
Vκ+α |= ϕ(U) =⇒ ∃β < κ Vβ+α |= ϕ(U
β) for some β < κ. (This definition is due to Jensen.)
Definition 1.5. We say that κ is absolutely indescribable if κ is α-indescribable for all
α < κ. (This definition appears in [5].)
Definition 1.6. We say that κ is extremely indescribable if for all formulas Π10 formulas
ϕ in the language L whose only free variable is second-order, for all sets U ⊂ Vκ, Vκ+κ |=
ϕ(U) =⇒ ∃β < κ Vβ+β |= ϕ(U
β). (This definition is due to Harvey Friedman.)
Here we are giving examples of cardinals κ such that Vκ satisfies reflection of formulas with
second-order parameters. Let us next consider what happens when we move to parameters
of third or higher order.
2. Reflection involving parameters of third or higher order
We have already defined A(2),β when A(2) is a second-order parameter. We define A(m+1),β =
{B(m),β | B(m) ∈ A(m+1)} for all integers m ≥ 2. We say that κ satisfies reflection with mth-
order parameters for all formulas in a class Ω if, whenever ϕκ(U (m)) for some U (m) ∈ Vκ+m−1,
there exists a β < κ such that ϕβ(U (m),β). It is inconsistent to postulate the existence of
cardinal κ which satisfies reflection for all formulas in L, where L is the language defined in
the second paragraph of the Introduction, with third-order parameters. This was observed
by Reinhardt in [4].
To see this, let X(3) be a third-order variable and let ϕ be the assertion that every element
of X(3) is a bounded subset of On. This assertion can be written as a sentence in L with X(3)
as the only free variable. Now, suppose that κ satisfies reflection for such sentences with
third-order parameters. Let U (3) = {{ξ | ξ < α} | α ∈ On∩κ}. We have ϕκ(U (3)). So by the
hypothesis about κ we must have ϕβ(U (3),β) for some β < κ. But this is impossible because
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U (3),β contains the set {ξ | ξ < β}, which is not bounded in On ∩ Vβ. Thus no ordinal κ
satisfies reflection for formulas in L with third-order parameters.
This means that in order to formulate consistent reflection principles for formulas with
third-order parameters or higher one must constrain the formulas relativized in some way.
Let us consider what Tait writes in [5] about this issue.
“One plausible way to think about the difference between reflecting ϕ(A) when A is second-
order and when it is of higher-order is that, in the former case, reflection is asserting that, if
ϕ(A) holds in the structure 〈R(κ),∈, A〉, then it holds in the substructure 〈R(β),∈, Aβ〉 for
some β < κ . . . But, when A is higher-order, say of third-order this is no longer so. Now we
are considering the structure 〈R(κ), R(κ + 1),∈, A〉 and 〈R(β), R(β + 1),∈, Aβ〉. But, the
latter is not a substructure of the former, that is the ‘inclusion map’ of the latter structure
into the former is no longer single-valued: for subclasses X and Y of R(κ), X 6= Y does not
imply Xβ 6= Y β. Likewise for X ∈ R(β + 1), X /∈ A does not imply Xβ /∈ Aβ. For this
reason, the formulas that we can expect to be preserved in passing from the former structure
to the latter must be suitably restricted and, in particular, should not contain the relation
/∈ between second- and third-order objects or the relation 6= between second-order objects.”
Now, suppose that we are reflecting a formula ϕ of the form
∀X
(m1)
1 ∃Y
(n1)
1 ∀X
(m2)
2 ∃Y
(n2)
2 · · · ∀X
(mk)
k ∃Y
(nk)
k
ψ(X
(m1)
1 , Y
(n1)
1 , X
(m2)
2 , Y
(n2)
2 , . . .X
(mk)
k , Y
(nk)
k , A
(l1)
1 , A
(l2)
2 , . . . A
(lj)
j )
This can be re-written as
∃f1∃f2 · · · ∃fk∀X
(m1)
1 ∀X
(m2)
2 · · · ∀X
(mk)
k
ψ(X
(m1)
1 , f1(X
(m1)
1 ), X
(m2)
2 , f2(X
(m1)
1 , X
(m2)
2 ), . . .X
(mk)
k , fk(X
(m1)
1 , X
(m2)
2 , . . .X
(mk)
k ),
A
(l1)
1 , A
(l2)
2 , . . . A
(lj)
j )
The point is that if this formula, without the existential function quantifiers, is conceived
of as holding in the structure 〈Vκ, Vκ+1, . . . Vκ+l,∈, f1, . . . fk, A
(l1)
1 , A
(l2)
2 , . . . A
(lj)
j 〉, where l =
max(m1, n1, . . .mk, nk, l1 − 1, . . . lj − 1) − 1, and we try to reflect down to the structure
〈Vβ, Vβ+1, . . . Vβ+l,∈, f
β
1 , . . . f
β
k , A
(l1),β
1 , A
(l2),β
2 , . . . A
(lj),β
j 〉 for some β < κ, then the functions
fβi are no longer necessarily single-valued. This consideration suggests the following reflection
principle.
Definition 2.1. We define l(γ) = γ − 1 if γ < ω and l(γ) = γ otherwise. We extend the
definition A(m+1),β = {B(m),β | B(m) ∈ A(m+1)} to A(α),β = {Bβ | B ∈ A(α)} for all ordinals
α > 0, it being understood that if Vκ is the domain of discourse then A
(α) ranges over Vκ+l(α).
Definition 2.2. Suppose that α, κ are ordinals such that 0 < α < κ and that
(1) S = 〈{Vκ+γ | γ < α},∈, f1, f2, . . . fk, A1, A2, . . . An〉 is a structure where each fi is a
function Vκ+l(γ1) × Vκ+l(γ2) × . . . Vκ+l(γi) → Vκ+ζi for some ordinals γ1, γ2, . . . γi, ζi such that
l(γ1), l(γ2), . . . l(γi), ζi < α, and each Ai is a subset of Vκ+δi for some δi < α
(2) ϕ is a formula true in the structure S, of the form
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∀X
(γ1)
1 ∀X
(γ2)
2 · · · ∀X
(γk)
k
ψ(X
(γ1)
1 , f1(X
(γ1)
1 ), X
(γ2)
2 , f2(X
(γ1)
1 , X
(γ2)
2 ), . . .X
(γk)
k , fk(X
(γ1)
1 , X
(γ2)
2 , . . .X
(γk)
k ),
A1, A2, . . . Aj) with ψ a formula with first-order quantifiers only
(3) there exists a β such that α < β < κ and a mapping j : Vβ+α → Vκ+α, such that
j(X) ∈ Vκ+γ whenever X ∈ Vβ+γ, j(X) = X for all X ∈ Vβ, and j(X) ∈ j(Y ) whenever
X ∈ Y , and such that, in the structure
Sβ = 〈Vβ, {Vβ+γ | 0 < γ < α}, {Vκ+γ | 0 < γ < α},∈, j, f1, f2, . . . fk, A1, A2 . . . An〉, with
variables of order γ ranging over Vβ+l(γ), we have
∀X
(γ1)
1 ∀X
(γ2)
2 · · · ∀X
(γk)
k
ψ(j(X
(γ1)
1 ), f1(j(X
(γ1)
1 )), j(X
(γ2)
2 ), f2(j(X
(γ1)
1 ), j(X
(γ2)
2 )), . . . j(X
(γk)
k ),
fk(j(X
(γ1)
1 ), j(X
(γ2)
2 ), . . . j(X
(γk)
k )), A1, A2, . . . An)
Then we say that the formula ϕ with parameters A1, A2, . . . An reflects down from S to β. If
for all structures S of the above form and for all formulas ϕ of the above form true in the
structure S, this occurs for some β < κ, then κ is said to be α-reflective.
It is not clear whether it should be said that the existence of α-reflective cardinals follows
from the iterative conception of set, because the definition involves a function j which guides
the reflection. The idea that the existence of indescribable cardinals follows from the iterative
conception of set can be motivated by an idea of Tait [5] which Koellner has called the
Relativised Cantorian Principle. Cantor wrote that if an initial segment of the sequence of
ordinals is only a set then it has a least strict upper bound. The phrase “is only a set”
can be replaced with other conditions for the existence of a least strict upper bound, and
for any given set of conditions it then becomes plausible to postulate the existence of a
level of the universe which is a closure point for the process of obtaining new ordinals in
this way. The indescribable cardinals can then be motivated by the idea that if a level of
the universe is describable then it cannot be all of V , and so this is a reasonable condition
for the existence of a least strict upper bound of all the ordinals obtained so far, and it is
reasonable to postulate the existence of a level of the universe which is a closure point for
the process of obtaining new ordinals in this way. So whether or not one should similarly
admit the existence of reflective cardinals as defined above depends on whether or not one
thinks it reasonable for the nonexistence of a function j guiding the reflection of the formula
is a sufficient reason to think that the level of the universe obtained so far is not all of V ,
and whether it is reasonable to postulate the existence of a level of the universe which is a
closure point for the process of obtaining new ordinals in this way. This may seem doubtful.
The Relativised Cantorian Principle always runs the risk of proving too much.
There is however another way to motivate a justification for these cardinals. In [1], Hellman
discusses the notion of a level of the universe Vα “Putnam-satisfying” a higher-order formula
with parameters, with respect to a particular valuation of the free variables. The definition
is by induction on the complexity of the formula, with all the usual Tarski clauses, except
that we say that Vα Putnam-satisfies a formula ϕ with respect to a valuation E of the free
variables, starting with an existential quantifier ∃X , where X may be a variable of first
or higher order, if there exists a β > α such that Vβ Putnam-satisfies ϕ with the initial
existential quantifier deleted, with respect to some valuation E ′ agreeing with E at every
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variable except X . (Actually, Hellman makes the further requirement that α and β be
inaccessible, but we shall not include this requirement.) The levels Vα with α inaccessible
all agree on what first-order formulas they Putnam-satisfy, but not for the higher-order
formulas.
Suppose we adopt a modified version of Putnam-satisfaction where we start with the
standard notion of satisfaction for first-order formulas, and for formulas with higher-order
quantifiers we define the notion by induction on the complexity of the formula as before. If
one postulates a reflection principle whereby if a level of the universe Vκ satisfies a higher-
order formula with parameters then a lower level Putnam-satisfies it in this modified sense
with the same parameters, then one can then proceed to prove the existence (assuming the
axiom of choice) of the reflective cardinals discussed here. The mapping j can be constructed
(assuming choice) from the Skolem functions witnessing the Putnam-satisfaction, at the lower
level, of the formula. The image of the range of the Skolem functions under the rank function
can be forced to be bounded above by κ by including all of Vκ+α, with α sufficiently large,
as a parameter, and modifying the formula to be reflected so as to include a clause saying
that all variables in the range of the Skolem functions must be contained in this parameter.
Conversely it is easy to see that our reflective cardinals are “Putnam-reflective” in the sense
just defined. This might be thought to be a somewhat more compelling justification.
We now give a consistency proof for this large cardinal property.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that 0 < α < κ and κ is iκ+α+1-supercompact. Then κ is α-
reflective.
Proof. Suppose that 0 < α < κ and κ is iκ+α+1-supercompact. Then there exists an
elementary embedding k : V → M with critical point κ such that iκ+α+1M ⊂ M . Let
S = 〈{Vκ+γ | γ < α},∈, f1, f2, . . . fk, A1, A2, . . . An〉 be a structure and ϕ a formula as in
the definition of an α-reflective cardinal. Working in M , consider the structure k(S). Since
iκ+α+1M ⊂M , the elementary embedding k induces a mapping j ∈M as in the definition of
an α-reflective cardinal such that the structure k(S) reflects down to κ inM via the mapping
j. Since k is an elementary embedding we may infer that there exists a δ < κ such that S
reflects down to δ in V . 
Next we show that α-reflective cardinals relativise to the constructible universe L.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that α < κ and κ is α-reflective. Then κ is α-reflective in the
constructible universe L.
Proof. Suppose that α < κ. Let SL = 〈{V Lκ+γ | γ < α},∈, f1, f2, . . . fk, A1, A2, . . . An〉 ∈ L
be a structure in L as in Definition 2.2, and let ϕ be a formula as in Definition 2.2 that
is true in SL. We may consider the formula ϕL with all γ-order quantifiers, for γ < α,
relativized to V Lκ+l(γ). Then ϕ
L holds in S = 〈{Vκ+γ | γ < α},∈, f1, f2, . . . fk, A1, A2, . . . An〉.
By introducing new Skolem functions for ϕL into the structure S to produce an expanded
structure S ′, we may replace ϕL with a formula ψ which is true in the expanded structure
S ′. Then since κ is α-reflective in V then there must be a mapping j which witnesses that
ψ reflects down to some β < κ. One can now make use of the canonical well-ordering of L.
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For each member of the well-ordering in the domain of j | L, one picks for the value of j at
this point the least member of the well-ordering which is ”admissible” in the sense that the
function j constructed so far has an extension to the entire domain of j | L with the desired
properties. Since the well-ordering of L is definable, in this way one can ensure that j |L∈ L.
This shows that ϕ reflects down from SL to β in L. 
Next we show that these cardinals are consistent relative to κ(ω).
Theorem 2.5. Suppose that κ(ω) exists. Then the set of all λ < κ(ω) such that λ is
α-reflective for all α such that 0 < α < λ is a stationary subset of κ(ω).
Proof. Suppose that κ = κ(ω). Let C be a closed unbounded subset of κ. We must show
that there is a cardinal λ ∈ C such that λ is α-reflective for all α such that 0 < α < λ.
Let S = {ι1, ι2, . . .} be a set of Silver indiscernibles for the structure 〈Vκ, ǫ, C〉. It can be
shown that it is possible to find such a set such that all the ιi are in C. Let M be a
Skolem hull of S in this structure and let λ = ι2. Then the mapping ιk 7→ ιk+1 induces an
elementary embedding j : M → M . Fix a well-ordering of (Vλ)
M in M and define a set of
Skolem functions with respect to this well-ordering. If we let Mn,n′ be the Skolem hull of
(Vλ)
M ∪ {ι1, ι2, . . . ιn′} in M for Skolem terms for formulas of complexity no greater than
Σn, then the mapping ιk 7→ ιk+1 induces a mapping jn,n′ : Mn,n′ → Mn,n′+1 which respects
the Skolem functions for formulas of complexity no greater than Σn, and restrictions of this
mapping to intersections of sets of the form (Vλ+α)
M with the domain of the mapping - which
we call truncations of the mapping - are members of M , because they are definable with
parameters from M . If ϕ is a formula with parameters A1, A2, . . . Am as in the definition
of an α-reflective cardinal where 0 < α < λ then ϕ will reflect down in M from ι2 to ι1 by
means of a truncation of the mapping jn,n′ where n and n
′ are sufficiently large. This shows
that ι2 is α-reflective in M and hence in V . 
Next we establish some properties of ω-reflective cardinals.
3. Restricted versions of Tait’s reflection principles
In [5] Tait defines the following set of reflection principles.
Definition 3.1. A formula in the nth-order language of set theory, some n < ω, is positive
iff it is built up by means of the operations ∨, ∧, ∀, ∃ from atoms of the form x = y, x 6= y,
x ∈ y, x /∈ y, x ∈ Y (2), x /∈ Y (2) and X(m) = X ′(m) and X(m) ∈ Y (m+1), where m ≥ 2.
Definition 3.2. For 0 < n < ω, Γ
(2)
n is the class of formulas
(1) ∀X
(2)
1 ∃Y
(k1)
1 · · · ∀X
(2)
n ∃Y
(kn)
n ϕ(X
(2)
1 , Y
(k1)
1 , . . . , X
(2)
n , Y
(kn)
n , A
(l1), . . . A(ln′ ))
where ϕ is positive and does not have quantifiers or second or higher-order and k1, . . . kn, l1, . . . ln′
are natural numbers.
Definition 3.3. We say that Vκ satisfies Γ
(2)
n -reflection if, for all ϕ ∈ Γ
(2)
n , if Vκ |= ϕ(A
(m1), A(m2), . . . A(mp))
then Vκ |= ϕ
δ(A(m1),δ, A(m2),δ, . . . A(mp),δ) for some δ < κ.
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Theorem 3.4 (Koellner). Suppose that κ = κ(ω) is the first ω-Erdo¨s cardinal. Then there
exists a δ < κ such that Vδ satisfies Γ
(2)
n -reflection for all n.
Theorem 3.5 (Tait). Suppose that n < ω and Vκ satisfies Γ
(2)
n -reflection. Then κ is n-
ineffable.
Theorem 3.6 (Tait). Suppose that κ is measurable. Then Vκ satisfies Γ
(2)
n -reflection for all
n < ω.
In [5] Tait proposes to define Γ
(m)
n in the same way as the class of formulas Γ
(2)
n , except
that universal quantifiers of order ≤ m are permitted. Koellner shows in [3] that this form
of reflection is inconsistent when m > 2. We formulate a new form of reflection which we
will be able to prove holds for an ω-reflective cardinal.
Definition 3.7. For 2 ≤ m < ω, 0 < n < ω, Γ
∗(m)
n is the class of formulas
(2) ∀X
(k1)
1 ∃Y
(l1)
1 · · · ∀X
(kn)
n ∃Y
(ln)
n ψ(X
(k1)
1 , Y
(l1)
1 , . . . , X
(kn)
n , Y
(ln)
n , A
(m1), . . .A(mp))
where ψ is positive and does not have quantifiers or second or higher-order and
k1, . . . kn, l1, . . . ln, m1, . . .mp are natural numbers such that lj ≥ ki whenever 0 < i ≤ j ≤ n.
Definition 3.8. We say that Vκ satisfies Γ
∗(m)
n -reflection if, for all ϕ ∈ Γ
∗(m)
n , if Vκ |=
ϕ(A(m1), A(m2), . . . A(mp)) then Vκ |= ϕ
δ(A(m1),δ, A(m2),δ, . . . A(mp),δ) for some δ < κ.
We shall now prove that if κ is ω-reflective then Vκ satisfies Γ
∗(m)
n -reflection for all m ≥
2, n > 0. Note that Γ
∗(2)
n -reflection is the same as Γ
(2)
n -reflection.
Theorem 3.9. Suppose that κ is ω-reflective. Then Vκ satisfies Γ
∗(m)
n -reflection for all
m ≥ 2, n > 0.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ ∈ Γ
∗(m)
n is true in 〈{Vκ+n | n ∈ ω},∈, . . .〉 and that ϕ is as in (2).
There must exist functions f1, f2, . . . fn such that
(3) ∀X
(k1)
1 . . .∀X
(kn)
n ψ(X
(k1)
1 , f1(X
(k1)
1 ), . . .X
(kn)
n , fn(X
(k1)
1 , X
(k2)
2 , . . .X
(kn)
n ), A
(m1), . . . A(mp))
is true in 〈{Vκ+n | n ∈ ω},∈, . . .〉. Since κ is ω-reflective there will be some β < κ and a
function j : Vβ+ω → Vκ+ω as in Definition 2.2 such that
(4) ∀X
(k1)
1 . . .∀X
(kn)
n ψ(j(X
(k1)
1 ), f1(j(X
(k1)
1 )), . . . j(X
(kn)
n ), fn(j(X
(k1)
1 ), j(X
(k2)
2 ), . . .
j(X
(kn)
n )), A(m1), . . . A(mp))
is true in S = 〈{Vβ+n | n ∈ ω},∈, . . .〉. As Koellner observes in [2], when ki = 2 for each i this
is enough to prove Γ
(2)
n -reflection. This is because the map X(2) 7→ j(X(2) ∩ Vβ is surjective
(in fact, the identity) on Vβ+1, and since ψ is positive the truth-value of the formula in S, for
a particular valuation of the free variables, never passes from true to false on relativisations
of all the free variables and parameters (and the relativisations of the Skolem functions are
still single-valued). To establish Γ
∗(m)
n -reflection for m > 2, we replace j in the above formula
with a function j′ which agrees with j on Vβ+1, and satisfies j
′(X) = {j′(Y ) | Y ∈ X} on
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Vβ+k \Vβ+k−1, for k = 2, . . .m. Now the mapping X
(k) 7→ j(X(k))∩Vβ+k−1 is the identity for
k = 2, . . .m. We also replace all the parameters A(mi) with paremeters A′(mi), chosen to as
to be the same as the original paremeters except that every element of the transitive closure
of the form j(X) is replaced by j′(X). Because lj ≥ ki for 0 < i ≤ j < n, it is now possible
to modify the Skolem functions in such a way that all the membership relations between
images of free variables under j′, parameters, and images of free variables under fi ◦ j
′ where
fi is one of the Skolem functions, will be the same as they were before when we were using
the old parameters and j instead of j′. Hence the formula (4) will be true in S, and then the
result of relativising all the parameters and free variables in the formula to β will be true in
{Vβ+n | n ∈ ω},∈, . . .〉. This completes the proof. 
It is also easy to see by examining Koellner’s proofs in [3] that ω-reflective cardinals satisfy
the reflection principles which he proves consistent there.
It is plausible to regard α-reflective cardinals as the natural generalization of Tait’s pro-
posed reflection principles. The fact that they do not break the κ(ω) barrier provides further
evidence for the view that Koellner has expressed in [3] that no reflection principle does so,
and reflection principles are not sufficient to effect a significant reduction in incompleteness
of ZFC.
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